山西省企业技术中心管理办法
山西省人民政府
山西省人民政府令第219号
《山西省企业技术中心管理办法》已经2008年3月30日省人民政府第4次常务会议通过，现予公布，自2008年5月1日起施行。
省 长 孟学农
二○○八年四月七日
山西省企业技术中心管理办法
第一条 为规范企业技术中心（以下简称“技术中心”）的认定、评价及管理，发挥
技术中心在技术创新体系中的核心功能与示范作用，确立企业在技术创新活动及技术创新体系中的主体地位，根据《中华人民共和国科学技术进步法》、《国家认定企业技术中心管理办法》等法律、法规，结合本省实际，制定本办法。
第二条 本省行政区域内的技术中心管理适用本办法。
第三条 本办法所称技术中心是指：在全省支柱产业、新兴产业、高技术产业中建立的具有示范和导向作用以及行业促进和带动作用的企业、行业技术经济组织。技术中心分为国家级、省级、市级技术中心。
第四条 设立技术中心应当坚持遵循国家产业、技术政策，符合本省经济发展战略，提高支柱产业及优势产品技术创新能力的原则。
第五条 县级以上人民政府应当支持和鼓励技术中心的建设和发展。
第六条 省人民政府工业经济主管部门会同同级科技、财政、税务及海关等部门开展技术中心的认定，并依据各自职责做好其他相关工作。
第七条 省人民政府工业经济主管部门具体负责以下工作：
（一）发布当年省级技术中心认定领域；
（二）受理省级技术中心申报；
（三）组织省级技术中心认定；
（四）指导省级技术中心建设；
（五）制定省级技术中心评价办法及指标体系，开展年度评价工作；
（六）公布省级技术中心评价结果。
第八条 申请认定省级企业技术中心的企业及技术中心应当具备以下基本条件：
（一）企业具备独立法人资格，年销售收入在1亿元以上，已被认定为市级企业技术中
心一年以上；
（二）企业重视技术中心工作，具有较强的技术创新和市场竞争能力，为技术中心的建
设及运行提供良好的条件；
（三）企业在全省同行业或者同领域中具备明显优势和重要地位，产品技术附加值高，技术创新在企业的发展中具有重要作用；
（四）技术中心应当具备政策研究、市场分析、知识产权管理及生产对接能力；
（五）技术中心应当具备完善的研究、开发及试验条件，稳定的技术创新投入；
（六）技术中心具有优秀的技术带头人和结构合理、技术水平较高的技术创新队伍；
（七）技术中心组织体系完善，运行机制健全，规划目标明确，产学研合作稳定，技术创新绩效显著。
省级技术中心认定每年组织一次。申请认定省级技术中心的受理截止日期为每年9月5日。
第九条 申请认定省级行业技术中心除具备本办法第八条规定条件外，还应当具备以下条件：
（一）由产学研或者同行业企业共同建设；
（二）行业共性技术扩散和服务能力；
（三）行业关键技术研发能力。
第十条 有下列情形之一的企业，一年内不得申请认定省级技术中心：
（一）有走私违法行为的；
（二）涉嫌涉税违法，已被税务部门立案审查的；
（三）因偷税、骗取出口退税等税收违法行为受到行政、刑事处理的。
第十一条 省级技术中心认定程序:
（一）拟申报企业向设区的市工业经济主管部门或者省行业主管部门（以下简称“主管
部门”）提出书面申请并按要求上报申请材料；
（二）主管部门对企业上报的申请材料进行审查，按照有关要求择优确定推荐企业名单
，并将企业申报材料及推荐意见在规定时间内报送省工业经济主管部门；
（三）省工业经济主管部门委托社会中介评估机构或者有关专家进行初评，并组织评审
答辩；
（四）省工业经济主管部门会同同级科技、财政、税务及海关等部门依据国家产业、技
术政策和省技术创新发展规划，结合初评结果、答辩意见，择优确定新认定的省级技术中心
，并以公告形式公布。
第十二条 省级技术中心实行动态管理，根据年度评价结果对技术中心给予表彰、警告、撤消资格。
第十三条 省级技术中心评价程序:
（一）参加省级技术中心评价的企业，应当根据省工业经济主管部门的评价要求于当年
4月30日前将评价材料报送主管部门；
（二）主管部门对技术中心上报的材料进行初审，于当年5月10日前上报省工业经济主管部门；
（三）省工业经济主管部门应当委托符合条件的社会中介评估机构或者有关专家对技术
中心上报的评价材料及相关情况进行核查；
（四）技术中心评价专家对需核查的数据按照技术中心评价指标体系的规定进行计算、
分析，得出评价结果，并形成评价报告；
（五）省工业经济主管部门对评价结果及评价报告进行审核确认，并在70个工作日内公布评价结果。
第十四条 省级技术中心的评价实行评分制，等级分为：优秀、合格、不合格:
（一）评价得分85分以上为优秀；
（二）评价得分在60分（含60分）到85分之间为合格；
（三）评价得分低于60分、企业依法破产及逾期一个月不上报评价材料的为不合格； （四）评价得分低于65分（含65分）的给予警告。
第十五条 有下列情形之一的，经省工业经济主管部门核准可以暂缓评价，但不得超过两年：
（一）企业搬迁；
（二）企业重组；
（三）企业技术、产品出现重大调整。
第十六条 有下列情形之一的撤销省级技术中心资格:
（一）不具备省级技术中心基本条件的；
（二）评价不合格的；
（三）由于技术原因发生重大质量、安全事故的；
（四）违反国家相关法律、法规的。
第十七条 省工业经济主管部门会同同级科技、财政、税务及海关等部门对调整和撤消的省级技术中心以公告形式公布。
第十八条 企业报送的申请认定材料和评价材料应当真实、完整。提供虚假材料的，经核实后，不得申请省级技术中心认定，已认定省级技术中心的撤销资格。
第十九条 企业发生更名、重组等重大调整的，应当在办理相关手续30个工作日内告知主管部门，并在10个工作日内向省工业经济主管部门备案。
第二十条 设区的市工业经济主管部门或者省行业主管部门，负责对在年度评价中受到警告的省级技术中心督促整改。
第二十一条 省人民政府有关部门应当对上年度评价中取得优秀等级的省级技术中心给予表彰和支持：
（一）省工业经济主管部门优先推荐申报国家级企业技术中心，对连续两年以上评为优秀等级的授予“山西省技术中心建设成就奖”；
（二）省科技行政主管部门对申报的项目给予审核优先和资金支持；
（三）省财政行政主管部门加大财税政策扶持力度；
（四）税务机关落实相关税收优惠政策；
（五）海关机关依法提供便捷通关、税收减免、凭保验放和上门服务。
第二十二条 行政机关工作人员在技术中心管理中，徇私舞弊、滥用职权的，由任免机关或者行政监察机关依法予以行政处分。
第二十三条 本办法规定的评价指标体系及评分细则由省工业经济主管部门另行制定。
第二十四条 设区的市人民政府应当结合本地区实际，依据本办法制定市级企业技术中心管理办法，并给予政策扶持及资金支持。
第二十五条 本办法自2008年5月1日起施行。
Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation
I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:
“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
